編者按：針對日本首相高市早苗的涉臺言論，清華大學(xué)戰(zhàn)略與安全研究中心研究員周波在《南華早報》發(fā)文駁斥。周波認(rèn)為，在沒有美軍支持的情況下，日本自衛(wèi)隊絕無能力與解放軍抗衡。從法理上看，日本也缺乏行使集體自衛(wèi)權(quán)的充分理由。周波指出，臺海局勢目前維持著多重的戰(zhàn)略模糊。中國政府視和平統(tǒng)一為首選，美國既威懾“臺獨”又勸阻中國大陸“武統(tǒng)”，而日本等美國盟友在后者自身立場未定前，也不愿做出具體的軍事承諾。

周波強調(diào)，高市所謂“臺灣有事就是日本有事”完全是本末倒置。如果日本將介入臺海視為既定事實，只會招致一場日本注定失敗的沖突。高市的言論是基于國內(nèi)政治考量的表演，注定只是短命日本政治周期中轉(zhuǎn)瞬即逝的漣漪。

【文/觀察者網(wǎng)專欄作者 周波，翻譯/北京對話 王凡非）

圍繞日本首相高市早苗上個月的涉臺言論，中日之間爆發(fā)了激烈的口水戰(zhàn)。暫且撇開這些喧囂不談，有一個簡單的問題亟待回答：如果失去了美國的軍事支持，日本自衛(wèi)隊真的承擔(dān)得起與中國解放軍一戰(zhàn)的后果嗎？

高市早苗的答案似乎是肯定的，即日本軍隊必須這么做。根據(jù)2015年9月日本國會通過的安保法案，即便本土未受直接攻擊，日本也被允許有限度地行使集體自衛(wèi)權(quán)。

行使這一權(quán)利有三個前提條件：

一、針對與日本關(guān)系密切的外國的攻擊威脅到日本的存亡；二、沒有其他適當(dāng)手段來擊退攻擊并確保日本的存亡及保護其人民；三、武力的使用必須限制在必要的最小范圍內(nèi)。

臺灣當(dāng)然不是一個“外國”。即便臺海爆發(fā)沖突，幾枚流彈意外落入與那國島附近海域（日本最西端的有人島），這又怎能被解讀為威脅到了日本的“國家存亡”？

就在日本通過安保法案的同一年，幾枚來自緬甸政府軍的炮彈落入云南省的一個村莊，造成五名村民受傷。中國政府將其視為意外事件，此事最終得以低調(diào)處理。

中日之間唯一的領(lǐng)土爭端在于釣魚島。盡管雙方的海警船均在該島海域巡航，但兩國軍方一直保持著某種默契，即都不派遣海軍艦艇進入爭議海域。

如果中日兩國因領(lǐng)土爭端而大打出手的可能性都微乎其微，那么因為臺灣問題而開戰(zhàn)就更是荒謬至極了。退一萬步講，即便真的開戰(zhàn)，日本在任何情況下都不可能獲勝。

況且，如果中國將日本軍事介入臺灣問題視為既定事實，解放軍為何不先發(fā)制人打擊日本自衛(wèi)隊？高市早苗鼓吹日本介入的可能性，恰恰是在招致她聲稱想要避免的沖突。

圍繞臺灣問題，存在著來自中國、美國及美國在亞洲盟友的三重“戰(zhàn)略模糊”。 從大陸面對民進黨連續(xù)兩屆執(zhí)政，卻依然提及兩岸和平中可以看出，中國政府視和平統(tǒng)一為最佳結(jié)果，并堅信時間在自己這一邊。

美國的戰(zhàn)略模糊則是雙重的。首先是其“一個中國政策”，該政策足夠圓滑，似乎可以隨時變換形式。其次是美方始終拒絕明確表態(tài)一旦解放軍發(fā)起攻擊，美方是否會軍事協(xié)防臺灣。

這種做法既是為了以此威懾臺灣不要宣布“獨立”，也是通過保留美軍介入的可能性來勸阻中國不要武力統(tǒng)一。

此外還有美國的亞洲盟友。日本有義務(wù)在戰(zhàn)爭爆發(fā)時提供后勤支援和基地。然而，當(dāng)五角大樓官員在7月向日本和澳大利亞施壓，要求其通過闡明一旦中美因臺灣問題開戰(zhàn)它們將扮演何種角色時，兩國均未對假設(shè)性的軍事沖突做出預(yù)先承諾，并表示任何決定都必須由屆時的政府做出。

這種拒絕選邊站隊的做法是可以理解的，畢竟當(dāng)美國自身都保持戰(zhàn)略模糊時，盟友幾乎沒有理由要把自己搭進去。

11月23日，日本防衛(wèi)大臣小泉進次郎視察位于沖繩縣與那國島的自衛(wèi)隊駐軍。X@shinjirokoiz

多方多層的戰(zhàn)略模糊產(chǎn)生了一種連鎖反應(yīng)。只要中國大陸認(rèn)為和平統(tǒng)一仍有可能，就不太可能對臺灣動武。

若非局勢惡化至此，美國就沒有必要放棄其戰(zhàn)略模糊。而只要美國維持這種戰(zhàn)略模糊，日本在此刻炒作臺灣問題就沒有什么意義。

2022年2月，日本前首相安倍晉三在接受日本電視臺采訪時，呼吁美國放棄在協(xié)防臺灣問題上的戰(zhàn)略模糊。

安倍重申了他那句老生常談的“臺灣有事就是日本有事”，聲稱中國大陸在臺灣周邊建立海空優(yōu)勢將影響日本的領(lǐng)海。這完全是本末倒置。

事實上，隨著臺灣的重要性在一位更加奉行孤立主義的美國總統(tǒng)治下逐漸減弱，美國可能會反其道而行之，走向更大的戰(zhàn)略清晰。

特朗普希望與中國在貿(mào)易問題上達成“大交易”，這使他有強烈的動機不去支持對抗中國大陸，以免被拖入臺海戰(zhàn)爭。

據(jù)《華爾街日報》報道，特朗普在與高市早苗的通話中告誡她要“收斂”在臺灣問題上的調(diào)門。那次通話發(fā)生在特朗普與習(xí)近平主席通話數(shù)小時之后。不出所料，日本政府官員否認(rèn)了報道中的說法。

高市早苗關(guān)于臺灣的聲明是一種政治行為，旨在鞏固其在日本國內(nèi)受眾中的地位。這不會作為有益的政治遺產(chǎn)載入史冊。在一個首相任期往往不滿一年的國家，她的言論不過是即將消逝的漣漪罷了。

【翻頁查看英文原文】

Putting aside the ongoing war of words between Beijing and Tokyo surrounding Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s statements on Taiwan last month, there is a simple question that needs answering. Can Japan’s Self-Defence Forces really afford to fight the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) without American military support?

Takaichi’s answer appears to be that Japan’s military must do so. The legislation approved by Japan’s Diet in September 2015 allowed the country to exercise its right of collective self-defence – albeit only to a limited degree – even if Japan is not directly attacked.

There are three conditions on acting on this right: if an attack against a foreign country with which Japan has close relations threatens Japan’s survival; if there is no other appropriate means to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people; and that the use of force must be limited to the minimum extent necessary.

Taiwan is not a foreign country, of course. Even if a conflict did break out across the Taiwan Strait and a few stray bombs accidentally fell into the waters off Yonaguni, Japan’s westernmost inhabited island, how could that be interpreted as a threat to Japan’s survival?

The same year that Japan passed its self-defence legislation, a few artillery shells from Myanmar government forces landed in a village in Yunnan province, injuring five villagers. The issue was resolved quietly because the Chinese government saw it as an accident.

The only territorial dispute between Beijing and Tokyo is over the Diaoyu Islands, which Japan calls the Senkakus. Although both have coastguard ships sailing in the waters off the islands, the two militaries have maintained a kind of tacit agreement of not sending their naval vessels into the disputed waters.

If the prospect of China and Japan coming to blows over disputed territory is so unlikely, it would be ridiculous for them to start fighting over Taiwan. Even if they did, there is no way Japan could win in any scenario.

Plus, if Beijing saw Tokyo’s military involvement over Taiwan as a given, why wouldn’t the PLA launch a pre-emptive strike on Japanese forces? Takaichi is inviting the very conflict she says she wants to prevent by raising the possibility of Japanese intervention.

There are three layers of strategic ambiguity around the Taiwan issue, stemming from China, the United States and Washington’s Asian allies. Beijing sees peaceful reunification as the best outcome and believes time is on its side. This can be seen in Beijing still mentioning peace across the strait despite the Democratic Progressive Party holding the Taiwan presidency for two consecutive administrations.

US strategic ambiguities are twofold. The first is its “one-China policy”, which is slippery enough that it seems it can take any shape at any time. The other is its continued refusal to specify whether it would assist Taiwan militarily in the event of an attack by the PLA.

This approach is meant to deter Taiwan from declaring independence, while keeping open the possibility of US military intervention is meant to dissuade Beijing from launching an attack and reunifying through force.

Then there are the US allies in Asia. Japan is obliged to provide logistical support and bases in the event of a war. However, when Pentagon officials pressed Japan and Australia in July to clarify what role they would play if China and the US went to war over Taiwan, neither target would commit to a hypothetical military conflict in advance and said that any decision would have to be made by the government of the day.

This refusal to stake out a clear position is understandable as there is little reason for allies to commit themselves when the US itself maintains its strategic ambiguity.

These layers of strategic ambiguity from multiple parties create a chain reaction. As long as Beijing believes peaceful reunification is still possible, it is unlikely to resort to military force against Taiwan.

Short of that, there is no need for the US to give up its strategic ambiguity. And as long as the US maintains that strategic ambiguity, there is little point in Japan raising Taiwan as an issue.

During an interview with Japanese television in February 2022, then-Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe called on the US to drop its strategic ambiguity regarding the defence of Taiwan.

Abe reiterated his oft-repeated notion that “a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency” and that the establishment of mainland Chinese air and sea superiority around Taiwan would affect Japan’s territorial waters. This is the tail wagging the dog.

In fact, as the importance of Taiwan recedes under a more isolationist US presidency, Washington might move in the opposite direction towards greater strategic clarity.

US President Donald Trump’s desire to reach a grand bargain with China on trade issues is a strong incentive not to support antagonising the mainland and being dragged into a war over Taiwan.

According to a report in The Wall Street Journal last week, Trump told Takaichi during a phone call to “temper” her tone on Taiwan. That call took place hours after Trump spoke to President Xi Jinping. Unsurprisingly, Japanese government officials denied the claims made in the report.

Takaichi’s statement on Taiwan was a political act, aimed at shoring up her standing with a domestic audience. It will not go down in history as a useful legacy. In a country where prime ministers often last less than a year in office, her remarks are merely ripples that will soon disappear.